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SUMMARY
Theists have claimed that the existence of God can be approached 
as a scientific hypothesis, and that His existence can be establised 
with a high degree of confirmation by observational evidence. The 
design argument proceeds from "the curious adapting of means to end" 
throughout all nature which resembles "the productions of human 
contrivance" to an "Author of Nature" who being "somewhat similar to 
the mind of men" is responsible for all these phenomena.
Arguments by analogy, which are much more subtle and complex 
than simple analogies, occur also in certain areas of scientific 
research and have been classified as an important type of inductive 
argument# Their function is to evaluate causal hypotheses. So, 
they are best understood when subjected to analysis appropriate to 
arguments offered in support of causal hypotheses in science.
Analysis of the inference by which scientific hypotheses are 
confirmed by observational evidence shows that its structure is 
given by Bayes's theorem. This schema could be used to turn the 
hypothetico-deductive method into a valid one by supplementing it 
by two kinds of probabilities. First, we must assess the probability 
that our observational results would obtain even if the hypothesis 
under consideration were false. The smaller the probability the 
stronger the degree of confirmation. This seems a natural inter*? 
pretation of Popper's methodological requirement that scientific 
hypotheses must be audatious and take risks. We must also assess 
the prior probability of the hypothesis we are considering. This
is a reasonable interpretation of Hanson's demand for plausibility 
arguments. The probabilities that enter into this Bayesian schema 
are interpreted as frequencies. This enables us to show the relevance 
of probabilities to prediction, theory and practical decision.
On the Bayesian analysis, the design argument, far from 
supporting the existence of God, provides strong evidence to the 
contrary.
INTRODUCTION
In both pagan and Christian traditions, the occurence of
order in the natural world is the most widely used and generally
accepted ground for arguing from the world to the existence of an
intelligent and pwerful creator. The argument, in various forms, is
to be found in Plato, Xenophon and Cicero; in Aquinas, Newton and
Berkley; and in a great many of the eighteenth century attempts
to establish the reasonableness of religion. In the nineteenth
century William Paley's version enjoyed great popularity and it
is in his Natural Theology that the classic statement of this
. argument is.JTound.
!?In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a 
stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might 
possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, 
it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy 
to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had 
found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how 
the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think 
of the answer which I had before given, that for anything I 
knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should 
not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? 
Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the 
first? For this reason, and no other, viz. that, when we - 
come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not 
discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and 
put together for a purpose, e.g., that they are so formed and 
adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion is so regulated 
as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the several parts 
had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different 
size form what they are, or placed after any other manner, or 
in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either 
no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or 
none which would have answered the use, that is now served by 
it" (Paley, Natural Theology, p.5)*
It is the same argument that Hume puts in the mouth of
Cleanthes:
"I shall briefly explain how I conceive..this matter. Look 
round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: 
you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, sub­
divided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which 
again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human 
senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various 
machines and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to 
each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration 
all men, who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapt­
ing of means to ends through all nature, resembles exactly, 
though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance 
of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since 
therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to 
infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also 
resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar 
to the mind of men; though possessed of much larger faculties 
proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. 
By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do 
we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity 
to human mind and intelligence" (Hume, Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion, p. 22).
The design argument is clearly an argument from analogy in 
that it appeals to observed similarities between human artifacts 
and works of nature. It must also, I think, be classified as 
empirical., -w
Arguments from analogy have been classified as an important 
type of inductive argument, and occur in certain areas of scientific 
research. Important applications of analogical reasoning are 
found in the field of medicine where experiments are carried out 
on animals in order to ascertain the effects of various substances 
upon humans • If we characterised such arguments as merely analog­
ical we would run the risk of seriously misrepresenting them and 
overlooking much of their force. The strength of a simple argument 
by analogy depends crucially upon the degree of similarity between 
the entities with respect to which the analogy is drawn. There 
is one obvious sense, however, in which such arguments are not 
simple analogies. This is that it is not the degree of similarity 
that matters most, but the relevance of the similarities and the 
irrelevance of the dissimilarities.
Such arguments initially characterized as analogies are really more 
subtle and complex. They are arguments whose function is to evaluate 
causal hypotheses. If we are to understand them we must subject 
them to the sort of analysis appropriate to arguments offered in 
support of causal hypotheses in science.
THE CONFIRMATION OF SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESES
Science is concerned, not only with matters of discovery hut 
also with matters of justification. The history of science contains 
many instances of old theories being replaced by new ones. But 
on what bases were the replacements made? One’s interest is 
aroused in such questions as whether, to what extent, and in what 
manner the old theory was disconfirmed; and similarly, what evidence 
was offered in support of the new hypothesis, and how adequate 
such evidence was. One might even ask whether nonevidential factors 
such as national rivalry among scientists, and esthetic disgust 
with certain types of theories operate in the selection of alternate 
hypotheses.
The most widely held picture of scientific confirmation is the 
hypothetico-deduetive method. According to this view, a scientific 
hypothesis is tested by deducing observational consequences from 
it, and seeing whether these consequences transpire. Some empirically 
determined initial conditions are supplied to make it possible to 
validly deduce the observational consequences; and auxiliary hypo­
theses are frequently made use of to connect the observations, with 
the hypothesis that is being tested. The hypothetico-deductive 
method can be schematized as follows:
H (hypothesis being tested)
A (auxiliary hypotheses)
I (initial conditions)
• *.0 (observational consequence)
Let us assume that the initial conditions I have established as 
true by observation, and that we can ascertain by observation 
whether the observational consequence 0 is true or false. Let us
assume, moreover, that for purposes of the present test of our
hypothesis H, that the auxiliary hypotheses A are unproblematic. 
Having made these simplifying idealizations, we can say that H 
implies 0. If 0 turns out to be false, it follows that H must be
false. This is deductively valid modus tollens. Given the truth
of 0, however, nothing follows deductively about the truth of H.
We would commit the deductive fallacy of affirming the consequent 
should we infer the truth of H from the truth of 0. According to 
the hypothetico-deductive view, the truth of 0 does tend to confirm 
or lend probability to H. If enough observational consequences are 
bourne out by experience the*hypothesis can become quite highly 
confirmed. Scientific hypotheses can never be completely and 
irrefutably verified in this way, but they can become sufficiently 
confirmed to be scientifically acceptable. According to this 
hypothetico-deductive conception induction is a kind of inverse of 
deduction. The fact that a true observational prediction follows 
deductively from a given hypothesis means, according to the hypo­
thetic©- deductive view, that a relation of inductive support runs 
in the reverse direction from 0 to H.
This account is inadequate. V/e need a more satisfactory account 
of scientific confirmation. The main shortcoming of the hypothetico- 
deductive method is that it gives us no basis whatever on which to 
choose between alternative hypotheses which are confirmed in exactly 
the same manner. It clearly stands in need of supplementation. 
Hanson’s Logic of Discovery:
We must take care in posing the question of the existence of a
logic of discovery for empirical science. It would be fantastic to 
suggest that there might be a mechanical method that necessarily 
generates true explanatory hypotheses. Problems of discovery aside, 
there is no way of determining that we have a true hypothesis. The 
logic of science cannot be regarded as an algorithm that would 
yield all scientific truth. But what could be reasonably demanded 
of a logic of discovery should such a thing exist? Hanson, and 
Peirce before him, answer not that it must generate true hypotheses 
but plausible conjectures. Hanson believed that this demand could 
be fulfilled. He began by distinguishing between "reasons for accept­
ing a hypothesis H" and "reasons for suggesting H in the first place". 
Reasons for accepting H will be reasons we have for thinking H true. 
But the reasons for suggesting H originally, or for formulating H 
in one way rather than another, are those reasons which make H a  
plausible type of conjecture. Hanson grants that non-logical factors 
play a part in the discovery of hypotheses, but he claims that there 
are, in addition, perfectly good logical reasons for regarding 
hypotheses of a particular kind as being those most likely to succeed. 
These reasons are logically distinct from the kinds of reasons that 
later, in the case of successful hypotheses, make us elevate hypo­
theses from the status of plausible conjectures to the status of 
acceptable, true, or highly confirmed hypotheses. Salmon distinguishes 
three logically distinct aspects of the treatment of scientific 
hypotheses. Those can be taken in any order, and can, he says, be 
mixed together. There are still three logically distinct matters:
(i) thinking of the hypothesis, (ii) plausibility considerations, 
and (iii) testing or confirmation. Salmon thinks that Hanson has 
correctly distinguished between plausibility arguments and the 
testing of hypotheses, but mistakenly conflated plausibility
arguments with discovery. Using Kepler as an example, Hanson di3- 
cussess hypotheses that would have been rejected by Kepler as 
implausible.
"Other kinds of hypotheses were available to Kepler: for example, 
that Mars’ color is responsible for its high velocities, or 
that the dispositions of Jupiter’s moons are responsible. But 
these would not have struck Kepler as capable of explaining 
such surprising phenomena. Indeed, he would.have thought it 
unreasonable to develop such hypotheses at all, and would have 
argued thus. (Hanson, "Is There a Logic of Discovery?" Current 
Issues in the Philosophy of Science; p.23)
Kepler would no doubt have rejected such hypotheses had they occurred 
to him. But thinks Salmon, there is no reason to suppose that these 
considerations were psychologically efficacious in preventing Kepler 
from thinking of such hypotheses - they might, however, have been 
efficacious in preventing him from mentioning them - and in causing 
him to think of others instead. Furthermore, he suggests, it does 
not matter in the slightest. What matters is that, had such unreason­
able hypotheses crossed Kepler’s mind, plausibility arguments'alone 
would have sufficed to prevent them from coming to serious empirical 
testing.
One basic question regains. Plausibility arguments can be 
distinguished from hypothesis testing and confirmation on the one 
hand and from the psychology of discovery on the other. But, what 
precisely is their status? Are plausibility considerations psychological 
or subjective in character? Do they play a legitimate role in 
science or do they merely reflect the prejudices of the scientific 
community? Are they different in kind from the considerations in­
volved in the confirmation of hypotheses? An answer will be forth- • 
coming when we consider what the probability calculus tells us 
about confirmation.
Popper's Method of Corroboration
Karl Popper's deductivism is one of the most interesting and 
controversial attempts to provide an account of the logic of science. 
The hypothetico-deductive method being ampliative and non-demonstrative, 
is not strictly deductive, and for as long as it is regarded as a 
method of supporting scientific hypotheses, cannot succeed in making 
science thoroughly deductive. Popper realizes this, and in arguing 
that deduction is the sole mode of inference in science rejects the 
hypothetico-deductive method as a means of confirming scientific 
hypotheses. He denies that induction plays any role whatever in 
science. Indeed, he maintains that there is no such thing as a correct 
inductive argument. He admits the psychological fact that people 
have faith in the uniformity of nature, but this, he says, is no 
more than a matter of psychological fact.
Popper's fundamental thesis is that it is falsifiability that
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characterizes statements of empirical science and distinguishesLthem 
from metaphysical statements and from tautogogies. Scientific 
hypotheses are general in form and so are amenable to falsification 
but not verification. One negative instance suffices to falsify a 
universal generalization; and no limited number of positive instances 
can verify a universal generalization. Positive instances are 
completely indecisive. It is the aim of empirical science to devise 
theories to stand the test of every possible serious attempt at 
falsification.. Scientific theories are conjectures or hypotheses; 
they are general statements whose purpose is to explain the world 
and make it intelligible. They are not to be regarded as final 
truths. Their status can never be more than that of tentative con­
jecture. They must always face the severest possible criticism. It 
is for the theoretician to propose scientific conjectures and the 
experimentalist.' to devise every possible way of falsifying these
theoretical hypotheses. The attempt to confirm hypotheses is no 
part of the aim of science.
General hypotheses in conjunction with statements of initial 
conditions entail predictions of particular events. We have a 
very high degree of intersubjective agreement concerning the initial 
conditions. We can likewise obtain intersubjective agreement as to 
whether the predicted fact occurred. Should the predicted fact fail 
to occur, the theory is considered to have suffered falsification.
The mode of inference is deduction. If the theory were true, then, 
given the truth of the statements of initial conditions, the pre­
diction would have to be true. The prediction as it happens, is 
false; therefore, the theory is false. This is the familiar prin­
ciple of modus tollens. According toPopper this is the only kind 
of inference applicable to the acceptance or rejection of scientific 
hypotheses. It is, however, clearly suitable for rejection only.
Hypothetico-deductive theorists would maintain that they had a 
confirming instance for the theory if the predicted event occurs. 
Confirming instances enhance the probability of the hypotheses.
With enough confirming instances the probability of the hypothesis 
becomes great enough to warrant provisional acceptance. With suffic­
ient inductive evidence of this kind we are justified in regarding 
it as well established. Popper rejects this positive account.
According to him if a hypothesis is tested and the result is negative, 
we can reject it. But on the other hand, if the test is positive 
all we can say is that we have failed to falsify it. There is 
nothing unique about a hypothesis that survives without being falsified. 
It might be that many other unfalsified hypotheses remain to explain 
the same facts. So, if science is to amount to more than a mere 
collection of our observations and their various reformulations, it
must embody some other methods besides observation and deduction.
Popper supplies that additional factor: corroboration.
A falsified hypothesis is replaced by one which has not yet 
been falsified. Not all unfalsified hypotheses are on a par. It 
is possible to select from among unflasified hypotheses. Again, 
falsifiability is the key. Hypotheses differ from one another with 
respect to the ease with which they can be falsified. An so they 
can often be compared with respect to degree of falsifiability.
Science, Popper maintains, is interested in bold conjectures. These 
must be consistent with known facts, but must also run as great a 
risk as possible of being controverted by facts still to be'accihmilated. 
The search for additional facts should be guided by the effort to 
find facts that will falsify the hypothesis.
As Popper characterizes falsifiability, the greater the degree 
of falsifiability of a hypothesis, the greater its content. Tatologies 
lack empirical content because they are compatible with any possible 
world. Empirical statements are not compatible with every possible 
state of affairs. The greater the number of possible states of 
affairs excluded by a statement, the greater its content, for the 
more it does to pin down our actual world by ruling out possible but 
non-actual states of affairs. At the same time, the greater the 
range of facts ruled out by a statement the greater the risk it runs 
of being false. A statement of high content is more vulnerable to 
falsification than one of low content because it has more potential 
falsifiers. So high content means high flasifiability. At the same 
time, content varies inversly with probability. The logical probab­
ility of a hypothesis is defined in terms of its range, or, in other 
words, the possible state of affairs with which it is compatible.
The greater the logical probability of a hypothesis, the fewer are
its potential falsifiers. Thus, high probability means low falsifi­
ability. Popper's choice is the opposite of that of hypothetico- 
deductive theorists who would recommend the selection of the most 
probable hypothesis from among those hypotheses that are compatible 
with the availabe. facts. He recommends selecting a hypothesis of 
low probability. Highly falsifiable hypotheses which are severely 
tested become highly corroborated. The greater the severety of the 
tests the greater the corroboration of the hypothesis that survives 
them. Hypotheses are not regarded as true because they are highly 
corroborated. Increasing corroboration is not a process of accumul­
ating positive instances to increase the probability of the hypothesis.
The crucial difference between Popper's deductivism and the 
hypothetico-deductive theorists is that the latter attempt to start 
with probable hypotheses and try to find further support for them 
through positive confirmations. When more than one hypothesis is 
available to explain all the available data, the hypothetico- 
deductivist would chose the most probable one. Popper, by contrast, 
would begin with the least probable hypothesis, for probability is 
related inversely to content. Popper would seek to falsify the . 
hypothesis. Failure to do so tends to increase the degree of corro­
boration. When more than one hypothesis remains unfalsified, we 
select the least probable one.
Salmon makes the following point about Popper's theory. In 
furnishing a method for selecting hypotheses Popper exceeds the con­
tent of the relevant available basic statements. Valid deductions 
are nonampliative and their conclusions cannot exceed their premises 
in content. So demonstrative inference alone cannot accomplish the 
task of selecting from among unflasified hypotheses. Popper does 
not pretend that basic statements plus deduction can give us
scientific theory; instead he introduces corroboration. Corrobora­
tion is a nondemonstrative form of inference. It is a way of pro­
viding for the acceptance of hypotheses even though the content of 
these hypotheses goes beyond the content of the basic statements. 
Modus tollens without corroboration is empty, modus tollens with 
corroboration is induction. So Popper's method must be characterized 
as a form of induetivism.
Hanson attacks the hypothetico-deductive method for failure to 
take into account plausibility arguments. Popper attacks the same 
method for failure to incorporate implausibility considerations.
While Hanson's and Popper's attacks are mutually incompatible, each 
has a valid coundation, and each points to a fundamental shortcoming 
of the hypothetico-deductive method. It seems that the logical gaps 
in the hypothetico-deductive method can be filled by means of the 
ideas suggested by Hanson and Popper and that these ideas lead us to 
indispensable aspects of the logic of scientific inference.
Causal Hypotheses and Bayes1 Theorem.
The basic problem with hypothetico-deductive inference is that 
it leaves us with a superabundance of hypotheses, all equally adequate 
to the available data. Each is confirmed in precisely the same
I
manner by the same evidence. A hypothesis is said to be confirmed 
when, in conduction with true statements of initial conditions, it 
entails a true prediction. Any number of other hypotheses that, in 
conjunction with the same or different statements of initial con­
ditions, entail the same prediction are confirmed in the same way 
by the same evidence. It is always possible to construct an unlimited 
supply of hypotheses to fit the bill. The hypothetico-deductive 
method is, therefore, hopelessly inadequate with respect to determin­
ing the acceptability of scientific hypotheses on the basis of 
empirical data.
When we look around for a more adequate account of scientific 
confirmation, it is natural to see whether the mathematical calculus 
of probability can offer any resources. If we claim that the process 
of confirmation is one of lending probability to a hypothesis in the 
light of evidence, it is reasonable to see whether there are any 
theorems on probability that characterize confirmation. If so, such 
a theorem would provide some sort of valid schema for formal confirm­
ation relations. Bayes's theorem seems well suited for this role. 
Salmon uses the following example to illustrate its application.
Suppose that a small percentage of pearls have a particular 
sort of colour flaw which renders them worthless. This flaw appears 
in 1% of all cultured pearls, and in 3% of all natural pearls.
Assume that 90% of all pearls examined are cultured pearls. Now, a 
pearl is found which exhibits this undesirable colour flaw. What is 
the probability that it is a cultured pearl?
Bayes's theorem can be used to solve this problem. It reads:
P(A.C,B) it  P(A,B) x P(A.B,C)
P(A,B) x P(A.B,C) + P(A,B) x P(A.B,C)
Let A be the class of pearls, B the class of cultured pearls, B the 
class of natural pearls, and C the class of colour-flawed pearls.
The formula involves the following probability expressions:
P(A,B) = the probability that a pearl is cultured = 0*9
P(A,B) = the probability that a pearl is natural = 0.1
These two probabilities are called prior probabilities.
P(A.B,C) = the probability that a cultured pearl is colour 
flawed = 0.01
P(A.B,C) = the probability that a natural pearl is colour 
flawed = 0.03
These two probabilities are called likelihoods of the two hypotheses.
It is important to note that they are not probabilities of hypo­
theses, but, rather, probabilities of the effect. It is the 
posterior probability that we seek when we wish to determine the 
probability of the hypothesis in terms of the given evidence.
P(A.C,B) = the probability that a colour-flawed pearl is cultured.
This is the posterior probability. Substituting the values stipulated 
we find that the posterior probability
P(A.C.B) = X 0#Q1_______  = 3 .
0.9 x 0.01 + 0.1 x 0.03 4
Notice that, although P(A.B,C)^ P(A.B,C), P(A.C,B)>P(A.C,B). The
inverse probabilities invert the order of the likelihoods.
In order to apply Bayes's theorem, we need the three probabilities 
P(A,B), P(A.B,C), arid P(A.B,C). Since the two prior probabilities
must add up to one, it is sufficient to know one of them, but the
likelihoods are independent, so we must have both of them. Thus, in 
order to compute the posterior probability of a hypothesis, we need 
(i) its prior probability, (ii) the probability that we would get 
the evidence we have if it is true, and (iii) the probability that 
we would get the evidence we have if it were false. None of these 
three is dispensable, except in a few obvious special cases such as 
if P(A,B)= 0 or P(A.B,C) = 0; if P(A,B) = 0 or P(A.B,C) = 0, then 
P(A.C,B) = 1.
In the hypothetico-deductive method, it is stipulated that the 
hypothesis being tested implies the evidence. So, in that case 
P(A.B,C) = 1. This value of one of the likelihoods does not determine 
a value for the posterior probability and, indeed, the posterior 
probability can be arbitrarily small even in the case supplied by 
the hypothetico-deductive method. This fact exposes the inadequacy 
of the hypothetico-deductive schema quite dramatically. Even though 
the data confirm the hypothesis according to the hypothetico-deductive 
view, the posterior probability of the hypothesis in the light of the 
available evidence may be even as small as zero in the limiting 
special case in which the prior probability of the hypothesis is zero.
The hypothetico-deductive method is fallacious as it stands, but 
can be rectified by supplementing it with the remaining elements 
required by Bayes1s theorem. According to the hypothetico-deductive 
schema an hypothesis H and statements of initial condition (which we 
will assume to be true and unproblematic) I, an observational predict­
ion 0 is deducible. H implies, 0. We have not as yet discussed all 
the problems involved in interpreting Bayes's theorem. So for the 
present, we can provide a loose and preliminary interpretation of 
Bayes's theorem. Let "A" refer to hypothesis like H, "B" to the 
property of truth; and "C" to the observed result with respect to
the prediction 0. If positive confirmation occurs "C" means that 0 
obtains; in the negative case "C" designates the falsity of 0. This 
interpretation makes the expression on the left hand side of Bayes's 
theorem refer to precisely the sort of probability we are interested 
in - i.e. "P(A.C,B) designates the probability that a hypothesis of 
the sort in question, for which the given observational results have 
been found, is true. This is the probability we seek in dealing with 
the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. We have seen that we need 
three probabilities in order to compute the posterior probability of 
our hypothesis. The hypothetico-deductive method provides only one 
of them. Given that H implies 0 and that 0 obtains, P(A.B,C) = 1. 
Bayes's theorem, however, reveals that this value is entirely com­
patible with a small posterior probability for the hypothesis. A 
small value for P(A,B) and a large value for P(A.B,C) nullify any 
tendency of the confirmation to enhance the value of P(A.C,B). 
Successful confirmation requires all three probabilities. Only one 
of these is provided by the hypothetico-deductive method. Bayes's 
theorem embodies the asymmetry between confirmation and falsification. 
If H implies 0 and 0 does not obtain, then P(A.B,C) =0, and it 
follows that the posterior probability of the hypothesis, P(A.C,B), 
likewise equals zero. Falsification holds a special place in the 
logic of scientific inference, as Popper has emphasized.
If Bayes's theorem provides a correct formal schema for the 
logic of confirmation and disconfirmation of scientific hypotheses, 
it indicates that we need to take into consideration three factors 
in attempting to assess the degree to which a hypothesis is rendered 
probable by the evidence. Roughly, it says that we must consider 
how well our hypothesis explains the evidence we have, how well an 
alternative hypothesis might explain the same evidence, and the prior
probability of the hypothesis.
The philosophical obstacle that stands in the way of using Bayes's 
theorem to account for confirmation is the severe difficulty in under­
standing what a prior probability could be. Consider the prior pro­
bability p (a ,b). It is the probability that our hypothesis is true 
regardless of the outcome of our prediction. This is logically prior 
to the empirical test provided by the hypothetico-deductive method.
How are we to make sense of such a probability? One preliminary 
point is apparent. Prior probabilities fii: the description of 
Hanson's plausibility arguments. Plausibility arguments embody con­
siderations relevant to the evaluation of prior probabilities. They 
are logically prior to the confirmatory data emerging form the 
hypothetico-deductive schema, and involve direct consideration of 
whether the hypothesis is of a type likely to be successful. Plausib­
ility arguments and hypothetico-deductive arguments are essential 
elements of a logic of scientific inference. We will presently, 
discuss these plausibility arguments with more precision. But for 
now it suffices that we have located them in the general schema.
Bayes’s theorem makes it obvious that we must consider the pro­
bability that our prediction would come true even if our hypothesis 
were false. Other things being equal, the less probable our observ­
ational result if the hypothesis is false, the more this observational 
result confirms the hypothesis.
Popper's view of scientific hypotheses has already been discussed. 
According to his view the more falsifiable they are, and the more 
strenuously we have tried to falsify them, the better they are, as 
long as they survive being falsified. To the extent that hypothetico- 
deductive theorists have been aware of prior probabilities, they 
have claimed that hypotheses are better confirmed if they have higher 
prior probabilities. In other words, if they are plausible. Popper
claims better corroboration for hypotheses that are more audacious 
and less plausible.
Bayes's theorem says quite unequivocally that plausibility con­
tributes positively to the acceptability of hypotheses. Nevertheless, 
Popper has a fundamental insight. There is another way in which a 
hypothesis could run the risk of falsification. Bayes's theorem 
reveals this. A hypothesis risks falsification by yielding a pre­
diction that is very improbable unless that hypothesis is true.
Such a prediction is a daring one, because it is not likely to come 
out right unless we have hit upon the correct hypothesis. This is 
reflected in a small value for P(A.B,C). The hypothesis that runs 
this kind of risk without being falsified gains more in posterior 
probability than one that runs less of such a risk. This does not 
mean that the hypothesis itself must be implausible. A small value 
for P(A.B,C)^is perfectly compatible with a large value for P(A,B) • 
There is a good illustration for this type of falsification in the 
history of optics. Early in the nineteenth century, Poisson deduced 
from the wave theory of light that the shadow of a disc should have 
a bright spot in its center. Poisson regarded this as a reductio 
ad absurdum of the wave theory. But Arago later obtained a positive 
result when the experiment had been performed. This was an impressive 
confirmation of the wave theory because the predicted consequence 
seemed utterly unlikely on any other hypothesis. What was improbable 
was not the wave theory itself, but the occurrence of the bright 
spot in the middle of the shadow if the wave theory were not true.
We have seen that Bayes's theorem casts considerable light 
upon the logic of scientific inference. It provides us with a 
coherent schema in terms of which we can understand the roles of 
confirmation, falsification, corroboration, and plausibility. The
theory of scientific inference it yields unifies such irreconcilable 
views as the hypothetico-deductive theory, Popper's deductivism and 
Hanson's logic of discovery.
We have so far, been concerned with the formal characteristics 
of Bayes's theorem and what we have said about interpretation has 
been vague. The formal schema requires prior probabilities. What 
precisely are prior probabilities?
The Status of Prior Probabilities
The notion of prior probability must be clarified in the light 
of the interpretation of the probability concept in general. We 
shall discuss this issue from the standpoint of three leading inter­
pretations.
1. According to the logical interpretation probability is 
fundamentally an a priori measure of possible states of affairs.
The state'descriptions provide a list of all possible states of the 
universe, and weights are assigned to all of them. A scientific 
hypothesis will be true if certain of these state descriptions hold, 
and false if others do. The range of the hypothesis is the set of 
all state descriptions compatible with the hypothesis. The prior 
probability of the hypothesis is the sum of the values attached to 
the state descriptions in its range. Accumulated observational 
evidence enables the calculation of posterior probabilities of 
hypotheses in accordance with Bayes's theorem. Prior probabilities 
play an indispensable part in determining the probabilitie.s of 
hypotheses. But the status of a priori prior probabilities is 
dubious. So we must reject this interpretation.
2. The personalistic interpretation is based upon a subjective 
interpretation of probability and makes extensive use of Bayes's 
theorem. Prior probabilities are totally unproblematic for
the personalist. They are simply degrees of prior belief in the 
hypotheses before concrete evidence is available. They are subject­
ive plausibility judgments. Evidence may affect this degree of 
belief, thus issuing in posterior probabilities. Bayes's theorem 
expresses the relations that must hold among these various degrees 
of belief. An examination of Bayes's theorem reveals that a prior 
probability of zero or one determines by itself the same value for 
the posterior probability. In the remaining cases,^rior^probabilityhas 
only a part in determining posterior probability. Under certain 
assumptions, the role played by the prior probabilities becomes 
smaller and smaller as observational evidence increases. Personalist 
theorists give this fg,ct a central place in the arguments. According 
to them we come to any problem with opinions and preconceptions.
Prior convictions of reasonable people can differ considerably. As 
these individuals, accumulate a shared body of observational evidence, 
differences of opinion will tend to disappear and a concensus of 
opinion emerge. • If the prior opinions do not have the extreme values 
zero and one their influence will fade in the face of increasing 
evidence. These individuals need not be genuinely open minded about 
the.various hypotheses. It is enough if their minds are slightly 
ajar. By showing how the use of Bayes's theorem leads to substantial 
intersubjective agreement, the personalists argue that the subjectiv­
ity of prior probabilities is not pernicious.
This far reaching subjectivism is unacceptable. It is true 
that satisfaction of the relations established by the probability 
calculus is a necessary condition for rationality. It is, however, 
not a sufficient condition. Other requirements for rational belief 
must be found. All the probabilities that enter into Bayes's 
theorem in the personalist interpretation are subjective. This
includes the probability P(A.B,C), that the observational evidence 
would occur if the hypothesis were true, and the probability P(A.B,G) 
that it would occur if the hypothesis were false. All these subject­
ive probabilities may actually be based upon extensive observation 
and inductive generalization therefrom, but they may also be lacking 
any foundation whatever in objective fact. Salmon thinks that there 
is no reason within the personalistic framework to reject as irrational 
a set of opinions which conflicts with the bulk of experience and 
dismisses this fact on the grounds that most observation is hallucina­
tory. Moreover, there seems to be no ground for characterizing as 
irrational opinions that have arisen out of observation by application 
of some perverse inductive method. Personalistic theories do not 
condone misuse of experience in the foregoing ways, but the principles 
by which they avoid them need to be spelled out, examined, and 
justified,
3. If one adopts a frequency view of probability, and attempts 
to deal with the logic of confirmation according to Bayes's theorem 
(as I do in this essay), then one is committed to regarding prior 
probability as some sort of frequency - for instance, the frequency 
with which hypotheses relavantly similar to the one under consider­
ation have enjoyed significant scientific success. The prior pro­
bability P(A,B) is the probability that hypotheses of a certain 
type are true. The attribute of truth is given directly by the 
fact that we are looking for true hypotheses. In attempting to 
choose an appropriate reference class, we are trying to find out 
what type of hypothesis is likely to be true. A hypothesis that 
-belongs to the class of plausible conjecture is one that has high 
prior probability. The question is how we are to determine what 
considerations are relevant to plausibility or prior probability.
Characteristics statistically relevant to the truth or falsity of 
scientific hypotheses are properties that determine a homogeneous 
reference class. To evaluate a given hypothesis H, we must find a 
practically or epistermically homogeneous reference class A to which 
H belongs. A must be a class of hypotheses within which we can say 
something about the relative frequency of truth. The probability 
P(A,B) is the probability of truth for hypotheses of this class, 
and this probability is assigned as a weight to the hypothesis H,
This prior weight expresses the plausibility of H.
Criteria for Plausibility Judgments.
There arethree important types of characteristics that may be 
used as a basis for plausibility judgments. These determine the 
relevant reference class, but they may also be regarded as criteria 
of plausibility that hypotheses must confront. Success in meeting 
a given criterion will classify a hypothesis with other plausible 
hypotheses; failure will group it with implausible ones.
1. Formal Criteria. Scientific hypotheses are proposed against 
the background of many previously accepted and rejected hypotheses. 
Newly proposed hypotheses may bear to accepted hypotheses deductive 
relations that are relevant to their plausibility. If an old hypo­
thesis entails a new hypothesis then the prior probability
of is at least as great as the posterior probability of H^. If
a new hypothesis H^, is incompatible with an old hypothesis then 
the prior probability of is no-greater than the probability that 
is false.
2. Pragmatic Criteria. There are cases where it is possible
to establish a probability relation between the truth of a hypothesis 
and the circumstances of its discovery. If a religious fanatic who 
has no training in physics or mathematics were to propose a hypothesis
to replace Einsteinian relativity we would justly place a low estimate 
on the probability that his hypothesis is true. Such considerations 
are legitimate only if there is a known probability relation between 
the character of the individual presenting the hypothesis and the 
truth of the hypothesis he advances.
3* Material Criteria. Just as relations of entailment or incom­
patibility can exist between different hypotheses, so too, can there 
be inductive relations among them. Certain types of hypotheses have 
been successful; we may legitimately expect new hypotheses that are 
similar in relevant respects to be successful as well. Analogy with 
successful hypotheses can serve as the basis for determining the 
plausibility of hypotheses. The material criteria encompass those 
respects in which hypotheses may be relevantly similar to one another. 
We judge the simpler hypothesis more likely to be true because ex­
perience has; shown us that simpler hypotheses rather than more complex 
ones have proved to be successful. Or we can distinguish through 
the kinds of causal processes hypotheses countenance. The physics 
of Galileo and Newton improved upon the physics of Aristotle by 
eliminating teleological elements in the latter. The success of non- 
teleological explanation in physics provided an important precedent 
for non-teleological evolutionary theories in biology. Ths success, 
of these theories in biology has providdd a strong basis for assigning 
low prior probabilities to teleological hypotheses in psychology 
and sociology.
These examples of material criteria provide some idea of the 
kind of plausibility argument falling under that head. We have seen 
that three criteria provide the grounds on which we can legitimately 
decide what kind of hypotheses are likely to succeed. It is ex­
perience that helps determine prior probabilities.
It may appear that the whole discussion has done little to show 
how precise values can be assigned to prior probabilities. Numerical 
precision is not required. Bayes's theorem will be applicable if 
we can merely judge whether the hypothesis is totally improbable.
If the prior probability can be taken as zero the hypothesis can be 
disqualified from further consideration. A zero value for P(A,B) 
settles the question because, in that case, P(A.C,B) is also zero.
Even a very small prior probability of the hypothesis leaves the 
question of its posterior probability open.
The frequentist - and that is the position we adopt - is com-
;
mitted to regarding prior probability as some sort of frequency.
So the question of the plausibility of hypotheses has something to 
do with our experience in dealing with hypotheses of similar types.
Thus the reason we would place a low plausibility value on teleological 
hypotheses J.s related to our experience in the transitions from 
teleological to mechanical explanations in the physical, biological, 
and to some extent, the social sciences. To turn back towards 
teleological hypotheses would be to go against a great deal of 
scientific experience about what kinds of hypotheses work well 
scientifically.
THE INTELLIGENT DESIGN HYPOTHESIS
The aim of the design argument is to show that the universe 
which exhibits a high degree of orderliness is very probably the 
result of intelligent design.
In attempting to assign a probability to the hypothesis that 
the universe was created by an intelligent being, we are dealing 
with a unique event. How are we to assess the probability of a 
single event? According to the frequency interpretation, probab­
ility is a relation between two classes. This fact is reflected 
in the notation, "P(A,B)M where expressions for two classes have 
been incorporated. The class mentioned first is the reference 
class; the other is the attribute class. The problem of the single 
case is the problem of selecting the appropriate reference class.
An insurance company, in determining what premium an individual 
should be charged for his automobile insurance, assigns him to a 
category of drivers who are similar to him in relevant aspects.' 
Reichenbach would have us choose the narrowest reference class 
for which reliable statistics are available. Salmon says, instead, 
that the single case should be referred to the broadest homo­
geneous reference class of which it is a member. In either for­
mulation the intent is fairly straightforward. Probability has «: 
to be established inductively. So we must have enough instances 
to be able to make inductive generalizations. We do not want, to 
refer our single cases to classes that are too narrow because if 
we do, we will not have enough evidence on which to base our 
inference. At the same time, we want our reference classes to
contain other relevant easels and not irrelevant ones. The key 
concept is statistical relevance. Suppose we ask for the probability 
that a given individual x has a characteristic B. We know that x 
belongs to a reference class A in which the limit of the relative 
frequency of B is p. If we can find a property C in terms of which 
the reference class A can be split into two parts A.C, such that 
P(A.C,B) ^ P(A,B) then C is statistically relevant to the occurrence 
of B within A. G must be the sort of property whose occurrence in 
an individual can be detected without knowing whether that particular 
entity also has the property B. If there is no such property C by 
means of which to effect a relevant subdivision of A with respect 
to the occurence of B, A is said to be homogeneous with respect to 
B. Let us apply this consideration to the design argument.
Let us now attempt an assessment of the probabilities required 
by Bayes!s~,#ieorem. We will begin with the prior probabilities 
p(A,B) and P(A,B), the probability that a case of coming-into-being 
is an instance of the operation of intelligence, and the probability 
that a case of coming-into-being is an instance of the operation 
of something other than intelligence.
We cannot perform an induction by enumeration on observed 
births of universes in order to draw a direct conclusion about the 
creation of our own. As Peirce has remarked, universes are not as 
plentiful as blackberries. "Have worlds ever been formed under 
your eye, and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress 
of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final 
consummation?" asks Philo in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion. The answer is negative. We can only make an indirect 
inference from the origins of other types of entities whose begin­
nings we can observe. So let us proceed on that basis.
The first step in applying Bayes's theorem is finding meanings 
for the terms that occur in it. Let 'A' denote the class of instances 
of entities coming into being. We will consider a broad class so 
as not to bias our evidence. The class A will include, for example,
(i) The formation of a fetus when a sperm and egg unite.
(ii) The building of a house that was designed by an architect.
(iii) The formation of ice as water freezes.
(iv) The growth of a tree from a seed.
(v) The carving of a gully by flowing water.
Let 'B' designate the class of instances in which intelligence 
operates.
(i) Proving a mathematical theorem.
(ii) Designing and making a watch.
(iii) Composing a piece of music.
•• (iv) " Designing a house.
*C* will be taken to represent the class of entities which 
exhibit order. .For example,
(i) A watch.
(ii) The solar system.
(iii) A living organism.
All the foregoing examples are entities which obviously exhibit 
some sort of order. We shall return to the concept of order below, 
to analyze it with greater precision.
Now that we have assigned meanings to the letters in Bayes's 
theorem we are in a position to interpret all of the probability 
expressions that appear in it.
P(A,B) = the probability that a case of coming-into-being is 
an instance of the operation of intellivence.
P(A,B) = the probability that a case of coming-into-being is
an instance of the operation of something other than 
intelligence.
P(A.B,C) = the probability that something produced by intelligence 
exhibits order.
P(A.B,C) = the probability that something produced by some 
agency other than intelligence exhibits order.
P(A.C,B) = the probability that something which comes into being 
and exhibits order was produced by intelligence. _
This last probability is the one we seek. Proponents of the 
design argument maintain that it is very high.
When we consider living organisms, both animal and vegetable, 
we see that biological reasons account for their generation in a 
very large number of instances. Birds build nests, bees make honey­
combs, spiders spin webs and a. whole host of other animals and 
insects build places to live in, store their food, and give birth 
to their young. The coming into being of such things as bird nests, 
spider webs, and honeycombs can be accounted for by the principle of 
instinct. The principle of mechanical causation accounts for the 
formation of snowflakes, and crystals, molecules and atoms, galaxies 
and solar systems. This principle obviously operates with great 
frequency upon the earth and, for all we know, everywhere else in 
this vast universe. Our universe contain perhaps 10 billion galaxies. 
Each of these contain, on the average from 10 to 100 billion stars.
Who can number the atoms formed in the interiors of these stars?
50It is estimated that our earth alone contain about 10 atoms. There 
are, it must be acknowledged, many unanswered questions in cosmology 
and astrophysics concerning the formation of galaxies, stars, and 
atoms. But we have achieved some scientific understanding of these 
processes. They appear to be mechanical. There is, consequently,
a great deal of evidence in support of the conclusion that the number 
of instances in which mechanical causation works is overwhelmingly 
greater than all of the rest combined; and the rest includes all 
these types of human artifacts that arise from intelligent design.
Our evidence indicates that P(A,B) is low, and that P(A,B) is high.
We now have a rough assessment of the prior probabilities.
We must give a closer specification of the particular case with 
which we are dealing. We need to take into account the type of order 
the universe exhibits. But first we must examine the nature of the 
intelligent creator hypothesized by the proponent of the design 
argument.
If we pay heed to experience it is impossible to assign a high 
probability to the hypothesis that the world, if created as a divine 
artifact, was the product of a God bearing any resemblance to the
theists1 conception. Experience suggests that a universe of such ..
sheer magnitude was not created by a unitary being. Where human 
artifacts are concerned, the larger the project, the more likely it 
was to have been executed by a group of people. Moreover, even very 
complex machines are sometimes made by dull artisans who merely copy 
the work of others. As Humes put it in the mouth of Philo, if we 
take into consideration the magnitude of the machine, and the imperfect­
ions in its construction, for all we know the world may have been 
created by a juvenile deity who had not mastered his trade, or a 
stupid deity who could only make bad copies, or a committee of 
deities or a senile one who had lost the knack by the time he got 
round to making the world. All of our experience suggests that the 
world was not created by a deity bearing any resemblance to the hypo­
thesized deity of the design argument.
Worse still, the God of traditional theism is regarded as pure 
spirit. In no instance within our experience has a disembodied
intellect produced any artifact, whether it might have exhibited 
order or not. To the best of our knowledge disembodied intelligence 
has never operated in any fashion. We are forced to conclude that 
for such an intelligence, p(A,B) = 0 and that P(A.B,C) is undefined.
Theists believe that the universe gives evidence of a creator 
who is intelligent powerful and benevolent. The addition of the 
moral attributes has an adverse effect upon the likelihood of the 
theistic hypothesis. Other things being equal, lowering the like­
lihood results in a reduced posterior probability. The likelihood 
P(A.B,C) is very low because the world seems utterly indifferent to 
values. Rain falls upon the just and the unjust. Evil abounds. 
Mankind is plagues by misery and suffering. Nuclear, chemical and 
biological warfare would be quite indiscriminating in their destruct­
ion. The problem for the design argument is not that of reconciling 
the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly benevolent 
God with the existence of evil on earth. Rather the proponent of 
natural religion must maintain that the world as we know it is 
positive evidence for the claim that it was created by a wise, power­
ful, and benevolent God. A scientific hypothesis is tested by deduc­
ing, observational consequences that would hold if the hypothesis 
were true, and then observing to see whether such consequences 
obtain. In the.eleventh dialogue Philo asks:
"Is the world, considered in general and as it appears to us in 
this life, different from what a man ... would, beforehand, 
expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity? It must 
be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence 
I conclude that, however consistent the world may be, allowing 
certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a 
Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his exist­
ence. The consistency is not absolutely denied, only the 
inference" Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.p.96.
Philo sees four rather obvious ways in which an all powerful, 
wise and benevolent God could have reduced the arnpunt of evil in the
world if he had wanted to (ibid.pp.96-102). (i) Man need not have 
been endowed with the capacity for pain, (ii) God need not govern, 
the world by inviolable laws. A little tinkering now and then could 
be quite beneficial: an extra large wave upon a warship out to inflict 
harm on helpless people: a little calming of the waters for a ship 
on an errand of mercy, (iii) Mankind and the other species have 
been so frugally endowed with capacities as to make their existence 
hazardous and grim. Why could not the creator have endowed them 
more generously, for example, with such capacities as industry, 
energy, and health? (iv) A further source of "misery and ill of the 
universe is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and prin­
ciples of the great machine of nature ... they are, all of them, apt, 
on every occassion, to run into one extreme or the other. One could 
imagine that this grand production had not received the last hand of 
the maker -sprlittle finished is every part, and so coarse are the 
strokes with which it is executed" (ibid. p.lOl).
What Philo is asking is whether this world is what we would ante­
cedently expect of an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God.
"Did I show you a house or palace where there was not. one apart­
ment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, 
passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building were the 
source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the. extremes 
of heat and cold, you would certainly blame the contrivance, 
without any further examination. The architect would in vain 
display his subtility, and prove to you that, if this door or 
that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he 
says may be. strictly true: The alteration of one particular, 
while the other parts of the building remain, may only augment, 
the inconveniences. But still you would assert in general that, 
if the architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have 
formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the 
parts in such a manner as would have remedied all or most of 
these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance 
of such a plan, will never convince you of the impossibility of 
it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in the 
building, you will always, without entering any detail, condemn 
the architect" (ibid.pp.95-96).
Given the hypothesis that God is supremely wise, good and powerful
there is a very low probability, P(A.B,C), that he would create a 
world such as this. This is not to say that the world does not exhibit 
order but that the kind of order it exhibits is not what would be 
expected as a result of creation by a wise, powerful, and benevolent 
creator.
There is a logical reason why the proponent of the design 
argument cannot abandon consideration of the moral attributes. When 
one asks what sort of order the world exhibits which gives such strong 
evidence of intelligent design, the answer one receives is "the adjust­
ment of means to end." Such considerations cannot be brought to bear 
unless we have some conception of what ends the means are designed to 
serve. If the ends are justice, mercy, and benevolence, one sort of 
order would count for intelligent design. If the end is to secure 
from mankind blind unreasoning adulation of and obedience to a Deity 
who says In;:bne breath, "Thou shalt not kill", and in another, "Slay 
and spare not", another kind of order would be suitable. If the creator 
is mainly concerned with winning bets with Satan, as in the book of 
Job, another kind of order would be appropriate. Thus, the moral 
attributes are inextricably bound up in the argument directed towards 
his natural attributes. As Hume has said, "Reason is, and might only 
to be, a slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office 
but to serve and obe^ them". (A Treatise of Human Nature. Bk.ii.Part:iii 
Sect.iii).
The theist believes that the order he finds in the world furnishes 
him with compelling evidence of intelligent design. The consideration 
that the order exhibited by living organisms comes from biological 
generation does not seem to the proponent of the design argument to 
undermine his position. Indeed such biological wonders reinforce his 
argument. Paley addresses this issue:
"Suppose, in the next place, that the person, who found the 
watch, should, after some time, discover, that, in addition to 
all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it 
possessed the unexpected property of producing, in the course 
of its movement, another watch like itself; (the thing is con­
ceivable;) that it contained within it a mechanism, a system 
of parts, a mould for instace, or a complex adjustment of lathes, 
files and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for 
this purpose; let us inquire, what effect ought such a discovery 
to have upon his former conclusion?
The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the 
contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the 
contriver .... If that construction without this property, 
or which is the same thing, before this property had been notice, 
proved intention and art to have been employed about; still more 
strong would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of 
this further property, the crown and perfection of the rest 
(William Paley, Natural Theology, pp. 8,9).
"The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of 
its works, construction, and movement suggested, was, that it 
must have had, for the cause and author of that construction, an 
artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its use.
The conclusion is invincible. A second examination presents us 
with a new discovery. The watch is found in the course of its 
movement, to produce another watch, similar to itself; and not 
only so, but we perceive in it a system of organization, separetely 
calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery 
have,-~qr ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as 
hath already been said, but to increase, beyond measure, our 
admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the formation 
of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once 
turn us round to an opposite conclusion, viz. that no art or 
skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all 
other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this 
last supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this 
be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism (ibid.pp.12,13)
In these passages, Paley deals with the most fundamental issue 
concerning natural religion and the design argument. For the theist, 
the order which arises out of biological generation is only further 
evidence of intelligent design. But, within our experience, all 
instances of intelligent design issue from biological organisms - 
biological generation always lies behind intelligence. We do not 
have experience of intelligent creation as a prior source of biological 
generation. Why then does the defender of the design argument in­
sists contrary to experience, that intelligent design lies behind 
the operation of any other principle which generates order. The
answer lies in a teleological conception of order. Cleanthes sees 
the universe as a "great machine", composed of a prolific array of 
"lesser machines", all of which, are characterized by "the curious 
adapting of means to end". This is a theme conspicuous in Paley who 
believed that the parts work together to achieve some useful end. 
Defenders of this argument seem to equate order with design. But 
this procedure begs the question. It appeals to an a priori principle 
according to which order is inseperably attached to thought and that 
it can never of itself or from original unknown principles belong to 
matter. The success of classical mechanics, and Darvinian evolutionary 
theory, banished teleological principles from nature. Galileo and 
Newton were responsible for removing the Aristotelian teleological 
conception from physics. The beautiful order of the solar system 
could be reduced to mechanical principles. The net result of the 
scientific revolution was to present a picture of the world which 
exhibits a worderful order and simplicity. The world is seen as a 
collection of material particles which respond to forces in accordance 
with Newton’s three simple laws of motion. The further development 
of classical mechanics, which reached it zenith at the end. of the 
nineteenth century, revealed that other forces, particularly electric 
and magnetic forces, also conform to simple and precisely specifiable 
laws. At the. turn of the century, it appeared that all natural 
phenomena could be explained in terms of these fundamental principles 
of classical physics. Darwinian evolutionary theory purged biology 
of teleological principles. Darwin showed how nonpurposive factors 
of chance mutations and natural selection could lead to the evolution 
of the species, and in the process of evolution theses species which 
are best a.dapted to compete for food and reproductive opportunities 
would evolve. It is true that evolutionary biology does pose many
problems, but there is no reason to think that a retreat into teleology 
is the answer. Twentieth century molecular biology has added to our 
understanding of the mechanisms of heredity by showing precisely how 
order is reproduced.
The constituents of the world behave in accordance with simple 
laws. This is a kind of order, but it is not the only kind of order 
nature exhibits. A random and totally disorganized system of material 
particles would obey the same laws as a finely constructed machine. 
Heaps of metal in junk yards obey the same physical laws as the most 
complex machines. The universe is not a cosmic heap of unorganized 
parts. Eighteenth and nineteenth century writers could not character­
ize this more satisfactorily than in terms of the adjustment of means 
to ends, and the similarity of the universe to man-made machines.
We cannot deal with the means-end relationship if we do not have some 
independent.^evidence concerning the nature of the end which is supposed 
to be served.. The similarity of the world to a machine can easily be 
challenged. Philo does precisely this when he says that the world 
resembles more a plant or a vegetable than a watch or knitting loom.
Scientific developments since about the middle of the last century 
have significantly clarified the concept of order. In dealing with 
physical problems closely related to practical concerns about the 
efficiency of machines, physicists and engineers created the science 
of thermodynamics. They established a viable concept of energy, dis­
covered laws relating the various forms of energy to each other, and 
developed the concept of entropy. Entropy is essentially a measure 
of the unavailability of energy to do mechanical work. Given two 
physical systems, each with the same amount of energy, the one with 
the lower entropy is the one from which it is possible in principle 
to extract the greater amount of work. All machines in the course
of their operation, tend to dissipate some of their energy in useless 
forms. They are subject to the universal law of degradation of energy, 
the second lav/ of thermodynamics. The discovery of this fundamental 
law of nature that entropy tends to increase has led to considerable 
speculation about the "Heat death" of the universe.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, thermodynamics was 
given a theoretical foundation in statistical mechanics, and the con­
cept of entropy was given a statistical interpretation. Low entropy 
was shown to be associated with non-random, highly ordered arrangements, 
which are relatively improbable. High entropy is associated with 
random, unordered arrangements which are relatively probable. If, 
for example, we have a container v/ith 80 molecules in it - 40 oxygen 
molecules and 40 nitrogen molecules - the arrangement would be highly 
ordered and non-random if all of the oxygen molecules happened to be 
on the lef-t-half of the container and all of the nitrogen molecules 
happened to be in the right half. The probability of the molecules
sorting themselves out in this fashion in the course of their random
-24motions is about 10 . Other arrangements where the molecules are
disperesed in a more more disorderly manner and at random are vastly 
more probable.
The problem of the design argument can be restated in terms of 
thermodynamic considerations. If we may speak in terms of the entropy 
of the whole universe, it would seem that the order exhibited by the 
universe can be described by saying that the entropy of the universe 
is now relatively low, and that it has been even lower in the past.
To say that the entropy is low is tantamount to saying that the universe 
contains large stores of available energy.
The question of creation can now be posed again. The universe 
is a physical system in a relatively low entropy state. Is there
strong reason to claim, by virtue of this fact, that it must have 
been produced by intelligent design?
According to the modern statistical interpretation of the second 
law of thermodynamics, the entropy in a closed physical system is 
very probably high. It is not impossible for the entropy of such a 
system to decrease as a result of a mere statistical fluctuation.
But such instances are very improbable. It is also possible for a 
closed physical system to be in a state of low entropy as a result 
of a recent interaction with its environment. For example, a thermos 
bottle containing tepid water with ice cubes floating in it is in a 
low entropy state. In course of time the ice cubes will melt, the 
water will cool, and the whole system inside the insulated container 
will arrive at a uniform temperature. This is a state of higher entropy, 
upon finding a thermos whose contents were in the lower of these two 
states, we would infer without hesitation that it had recently been 
put into that state by an outside agency - in this case, by a person 
who removed the ice cubes from a refrigerator and deliberately placed 
them in the thermos with water. This is a case of low entropy result­
ing from interaction with an intelligent planner who put the ice 
cubes into water to fulfill a conscious purpose. Low entropy states 
which are the result of interaction with the environment do not always 
involve human intervention. A hailstorm on a summer day may deposit 
pieces of ice in the luke warm water of a swimming pool.
It is more desirable to reformulate the problem of intelligent 
design in terms of the concept of entropy. The vauge concept of 
order can thus be avoided and there will not be as strong a temptation 
to beg the question by identifying low entropy with conscious design 
as there was to identify order with purpose and "the adjustment of 
means to ends". We may look around the world, surveying the physical
systems which come into being with low-entropy states, to ascertain 
what percentage of them are created with conscious design. The result 
will be similar to those already discussed. An exceedingly small 
proportion of low-entropy systems results from an interaction with 
the environment which involves any conscious purpose or design. We 
are forced to conclude that the probability, P(A.B,C) is much larger 
than the probability P(A.B,C). In other words it is a lot more likely 
that some cause or causes other than an intelligent creator explains 
the order we find in the universe.
Today we are in a position to claim some physical knowledge about
the evolution of the universe. There is reason to believe that,
sometime between ten and twenty billion years ago, the universe con­
sisted of a compact concentration of energy which exploded with 
incredible violence. This 'big bang* theory is supported by observed 
red-shifts of light from distant galaxies and by the more recently 
discovered cosmic microwave background radiation. It would seem 
likely that statistical fluctuations in the rapidly expanding fireball 
gave rise to stable inhomogeneities, by gravitational attraction of 
neighbouring matter, led to the formation of galaxies. Further con­
centrations within the galaxies led to the foimation of stars. Our 
universe contains about ten billion such galaxies. Each of these is 
an inhomogeneous concentration of energy. Each galaxy contains about 
ten billion stars. These again are inhomogeneous concentrations of 
energy. We can cite 100 billion billion systems which came into being 
in states of low entropy. Where can we find like numbers of systems 
created in low entropy states by conscious human intervention? We
have some knowledge of how atoms are formed in the interiors of stars.
50The earth alone contains about 10 atoms, each a highly organized low- 
entropy system, and each, to the best of our knowledge, brought into
being without conscious intent. The low entropy systems created 
without intelligent purpose outnumber overwhelmingly those which 
involve intelligent design. We can counclude that the design 
argument is very improbable.
CONCLUSION
Let us now take stock of the whole situation. We have made 
plausibility assessments of the probabilities required for the 
application of Bayes's theorem.
Let us consider the prior probability P(A,B) -i.e. the pro­
bability that the universe was created by an intelligent being.
Since we are dealing with a unique event we must refer it to a broad 
reference class and so can only make an indirect inference from 
the origins of entities whose beginnings we can observe. All of 
our experience suggests that P(A,B) is overwhelmingly greater than 
P(A,B). The prior probability of the intelligent design hypothesis 
is very low.
We can also say quite confidently that the probability P(A.C,B) - 
that an unspecified entity, which came into being and exhibited order, 
was produced by .intelligent design - is quite low. This conclusion 
can be reinforced even more directly when we consider all the entities 
with which we are acquainted which come into being exhibiting order.
If we count the relative frequency with which such entities were the 
result of intelligent design, we see that it is rather low. This 
conclusion holds even when we exclude such items as galaxies and 
atoms on the grounds that we are not very sure how they are created. 
There is still a vast numerical preponderance of such occurrences 
as animal reproduction, growth from seeds, formation of crystals, 
and spinning of spider webs over the relatively few instances in
which watches, houses, and ships are built by man.
When we consider the nature of the creator hypothesized by 
proponents of the design argument it becomes clear that the kind of 
order the world exhibits is not what would be expected as a result 
of creation by a wise, powerful and benevolent deity. If the 
intelligent design hypothesis is true it makes the facts to be 
explained quite improbable*
We have to assign a low plausibility value to the intelligent 
design hypothesis. Experience teaches us that mechanical hypotheses 
work better than teleological ones. The history of science reveals 
a transition from teleological to mechanical explanations in the 
physical, biological, and even the social sciences. Furthermore 
the teleological intelligent design hypothesis fits very badly with 
recent scientific developments.
In brief:
(i) The intelligent design hypothesis is antecendently 
implausible.
(ii) It makes the facts to be explained quite improbable if 
: it is true.
(iii) There are plausible alternative hypotheses which make 
the facts to be explained highly probable.
Under these circumstances, only gross prejudice would make one 
retain the intelligent design hypothesis.
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